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*The individual classification of each article in this issue is given at the end of the article.

**Note: On Maps 13516 and 13517, Nanking is erroneously under-scored. The city is not a "Communist municipality."

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POSTWAR RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT ON SAKHALIN ISLAND*

Significant Soviet efforts to expand and improve the railroad facilities on Sakhalin Island are revealed by postwar intelligence. The most important project now under way is the construction of a north-south trunkline in northern Sakhalin. The purpose of this line appears to be the integration of the already existing Soviet lines in the north with the former Japanese network in southern Sakhalin [Karafuto].** According to all indications, this railroad will connect with the lines now terminating at Okha ($53^{\circ}35'N$ - $142^{\circ}56'E$), Tymovskoye ($50^{\circ}50'N$ - $142^{\circ}40'E$), and Pobedino [Koton] ($49^{\circ}40'N$ - $142^{\circ}49'E$).

Until recently, the rail network in northern Sakhalin consisted mainly of a broad-gauge (5'0") railroad that connected the important Okha oil-production center with the sheltered west-coast port of Moskal'vo ($53^{\circ}35'N$ - $142^{\circ}41'E$). The remaining lines included a few narrow-gauge spurs serving the Okha oilfields and a reported narrow-gauge (2'10", also reported as 2'6") line operating between Tymovskoye (formerly Derbinskoye, $50^{\circ}50'N$ - $142^{\circ}42'E$) and the small

*Research for this study was undertaken in collaboration with the Photo Intelligence Division, Geographic Area, ORR. The Soviet Branch, Industrial Register, OCD, contributed valuable source materials.

**Japanese place-name equivalents are given in brackets.

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port of Arkova ($50^{\circ}58'N$ - $142^{\circ}13'E$), about 5 miles north of the former administrative center of Aleksandrovsk.

In southern Sakhalin, the Japanese had developed a good railroad system consisting of two north-south lines paralleling the coasts and connected by an east-west line, all lines of 3'6" gauge. The east-coast line connected the port of Korsakov [Otomari], on Zaliv (bay) Aniva, with Pobedino in the central Poronay River valley. The west-coast line operates between Il'inskiy in the north and Gornozavodsk [Naihoru] near the southern tip of Sakhalin. The east-west line runs between the capital city, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk [Toyohara], and the west-coast port of Kholmsk [Maoka]. In addition to these main lines, there are a number of short spur lines that serve coal mines and minor ports along both coasts. All the railroads of southern Sakhalin are still in operation, using original Japanese equipment. The Soviets are reportedly extending the lines on both the east and west coasts, as well as adding stretches of industrial line leading into the interior.

25X1D

25X1D

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] partly confirms information from repatriated Japanese prisoners of war on new railroad construction between Okha, Aleksandrovsk, and Pobedino. [REDACTED]

25X1D

a new railroad line nearing completion from Okha southward along the east coast to the settlement of Nogliki at the mouth of the Tym' River. This stretch of 150 miles is now believed to be completed

S-E-C-R-E-T

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and in operation.

The assumption as to the

ultimate course of the line between Nogliki, Tymovskoye, and Pobedino is based largely on information from the Japanese POW's, who report railroad construction taking place between Okha and Aleksandrovsk (apparently through Nogliki and Tymovskoye) and from Pobedino northward across the former Soviet-Japanese frontier. The impression also exists that some sort of rail line has by now been laid between Pobedino and Tymovskoye.

A railroad in northern Sakhalin connecting with the transportation system of the southern part of the island is extremely significant, because it would cross an area believed to be rich in oil resources. Current annual production of oilfields in the Okha-Ekhabl region in the north is estimated at 1,000,000 tons of oil. Less productive fields are located in the Katangli region, between the mouth of the Tym' and Nabil'skiy Zaliv. Between these two oil centers exploitation has been scattered and production insignificant, largely because of the lack of adequate means of transportation. With a new railroad available, minor exploitation sites on the Poronay (52°49'N - 143°03'E) and Nutovo Rivers (52°35'N - 143°07'E) and in the Boatsyn area (52°25'N - 143°11'E) could mushroom into significant oil-producing centers.

A railroad between Okha and Pobedino would also speed up the transport of freight and passengers throughout the entire 600-mile

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length of Sakhalin Island. Furthermore, it would help solve the military supply problem, which is exemplified by the situation at Tymovskoye, a garrison center for Soviet ground and air forces stationed in central Sakhalin. During the summer, military supplies from the Soviet mainland are received at the ports of Arkova and Aleksandrovsk and presumably shipped to Tymovskoye over the reported narrow-gauge railroad and a parallel dirt road. During the winter, however, Arkova and Aleksandrovsk are icebound, and supplies must be brought over the frozen Tatar Strait or sent to the relatively ice-free port of Korsakov on the southern coast of Sakhalin, moved by rail to Pobedino, and then transshipped by road to Tymovskoye.

Although construction of the new trunkline would facilitate rail movement throughout the island, continuous transport from north to south may still not be possible because of different gauges of the various connecting lines. According to Japanese POW sources, the gauge of the Okha-Nogliki section of the trunkline is 1 meter (3' 3-3/8"), which is widely used on the Soviet mainland for industrial lines. There is the possibility, however, that the new line may be of the Japanese 3'6" gauge. The existing Okha-Moskal'vo line is 5' gauge. Transfer of freight and passengers may therefore be necessary at Okha and Pobedino.

If plans to link Sakhalin railroads are to be fully realized, it is believed that either the 3'6"-gauge lines would be converted to meter gauge or all new lines under construction would be of the

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3'6" gauge. A report that the Soviets are converting former Japanese lines to broad gauge is doubted. Such a project would entail widening of roadbeds, bridges, and tunnels, as well as the remodeling of signal facilities. Conversion of the 3'6" to meter gauge would be comparatively simple, involving only the moving inward of one rail.

The accompanying map (13544) presents as up-to-date a picture as possible of the transportation facilities and also of the settlements on Sakhalin Island. The names and locations of most of the settlements shown on the map were compiled from available Soviet and English-language maps, but a few were reported by Japanese POW's and are not shown on any other available maps. The new railroads and the coastal highway have also been plotted as overlays on 1:250,000 maps to provide a more detailed presentation. Two copies of the overlays have been made available for loan at the CIA Map Library under Call No. ML-CIA-91628.

In the following pages are discussed (1) the possible Okha-Tymovskoye-Pobedino trunkline, with emphasis on the Okha-Nogliki section, and (2) several additional stretches of railroad under construction in southern Sakhalin.

Okha-Tymovskoye-Pobedino Trunkline

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Description of this new railroad development is confined mainly to the Okha-Nogliki section of the line, [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

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- 5 -

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In general, the railroad parallels the coastline of the Sea of Okhotsk. It traverses a narrow coastal plain, which lies between the low foothills and the extensive marshlands that skirt the coast. The coastal plain is broken into segments by deeply penetrating lagoons, bays, and river estuaries, and spits of land parallel the coast, leaving only narrow outlets for navigation. The route has few steep grades but crosses many streams, rivulets, and swamp areas.

25X1D

wherever possible, fill has been used to avoid the construction of long bridges, and many large culverts covered with fill are evident. A newly constructed coastal highway parallels the railroad but follows a more tortuous route, crossing and recrossing the railroad many times. Road bridges appear to have been built mainly across the larger rivers; smaller streams are crossed by fords. The highway probably served as a supply route during construction of the railroad.

Okha, the northern terminus of the new trunkline, is one of the most important oil-production centers in the Soviet Far East. According to reports some 2,000 oil wells extend from the eastern edge of town to the Okhotsk Sea; about 250 wells are identified

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A sizable oil refinery is located in the southwestern part

25X1D

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of town, and there are a number of other local industries. An air-
field is on the northern edge of the town near Zaliv Neutu, and a
seaplane station is reported near Okha, on Zaliv Urkt. [REDACTED]

25X1D

25X1D

[REDACTED] shows two railroad stations. One is the terminus of the
new trunkline and also seems to handle traffic for an intricate net-
work of narrow-gauge lines serving the Okha oilfields. A narrow-
gauge track appears to lead eastward to the second station, which is
the terminus of the broad-gauge line to Moskal'vo.

The new trunkline was essentially completed by 1951 as far as
Zaliv Odoptu, about 15 miles south of Okha. Along this stretch, the
railroad follows the western shoreline of Zaliv Urkt at the base of
a rather low bluff, where slides could easily cut the line in a
number of places. Two small trestle bridges appear on the photog-
raphy between Okha and Gilyako-Bunam, a small village at the south-
western edge of Zaliv Urkt.

At Gilyako-Bunam a possible railroad spur leads inland, follow-
ing the valley of the Gilyako-Bunam River. This spur line, accord-
ing to reports, is approximately 10 miles long and leads through the
Ekhabi oilfields to a new oilfield development. [REDACTED]

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

[REDACTED] Although there are indications that a rail
line may be there, the grades are much too steep for conventional
railroad operation and no railroad cars or other facilities [REDACTED]

25X1D

[REDACTED] Near its junction with the Okha-Nogliki line,

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the spur alignment apparently crosses the delta of the Gilyako-Bunam River over extensive fill areas and two multiple-span bridges. The Ekhabi oilfields are heavily exploited. Some 450 to 500 wells are observed in the area, with a system of interconnecting pipelines on the surface of the ground. A pipeline also leads to oil-storage tanks in the Okha complex.

Beyond Gilyako-Bunam the main line follows the southern shore of Zaliv Urkt and then turns southward to the settlements of Biryukan and East Ekhabi. Biryukan is the center of a small oil-field some 9 miles south of Okha. Three large prison camps are [REDACTED] in this area, as well as defense positions that are part of a system of coastal defenses stretching from Zaliv Urkt to Zaliv Ekhabi. Most of these positions appear to be unoccupied. East Ekhabi, a relatively new town, is located about 10 miles south of Okha, on the western shore of Zaliv Ekhabi. It has an estimated population of 5,000 and is reportedly the third largest oil-producing center in the Okha-Nogliki region. About 100 wells and 2 pumping stations are in the area, and developments to extend the operation are under way.

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25X1D

[REDACTED] two freight trains in the East Ekhabi area, one consisting of 6 boxcars and the other of 11 tank-type cars. [REDACTED]

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25X1D

25X1D

[REDACTED] Two buildings that look like warehouses are located near the station. A railroad spur appears to lead to a nearby lumberyard.

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Between Zaliv Ekhabi and Zaliv Odoptu, a distance of some 6 miles, the railroad passes two large lumberyards. A rail spur leads into the first yard, and the second yard is adjacent to a square-shaped prison camp. It is quite possible that these installations were used as supply and maintenance bases for construction work along the railroad.

As of October 1951, railroad construction between Zaliv Odoptu and the mouth of the Tym' River was in various stages of completion. In areas where little fill was required the railroad bed appears to have been completed. In many sections where the line crosses swampy marshland or approaches riverbeds, construction was still in progress. The height of the rail bed appears to range from 5 feet in dry areas to as much as 20 feet where it crosses depressions, marshes, and smaller streams. The bed is probably made of gravel, which is readily available along the route.

The line apparently continues in a southerly

direction, skirting an area containing muddy tidal flats, sand dunes, and an elongated lagoon known as Zaliv Pil'tun. Bridges and fills are probably used to cross the many minor streams and swamp areas. Two large, walled, square-shaped prison camps are situated near the railroad, one to the east of the line, near Ozero (lake) Ovech'ye, and the second to the west, near the Mukhi River crossing. Evidence

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of considerable bridge construction work is noted where the railroad crosses the Paromay River valley. At one point it would appear that some of the heavy construction equipment is mounted on rail cars, suggesting that the line may have been completed that far. Just south of the Paromay River crossing, two short spur lines branch off the main line. One follows the Paromay River inland to newly developed oilfields that were formerly a Japanese concession. The other spur parallels the river downstream for a short distance.

The large number of incomplete bridge structures south of the Paromay River crossing suggests that railroad construction was still going on. The rail alignment is frequently intersected by the zig-zagging course of the adjacent coastal highway. Square-shaped prison camps are noted near the crossing of the Pil'tun River and also some 6 miles farther south near a bridge over an unnamed river. A short spur line branches off the main line just north of the Nutovo River bridge and leads northwestward to an oil exploitation area. Some 11 oil derricks [REDACTED] covering this area. Railroad construction equipment appears to be mounted on rail cars near the Nutovo River crossing. Available English-language maps show a second spur line that leads from the main line southeastward to a point on the Malaya Goromay River. [REDACTED] this line does not appear to be in use. The narrow-gauge line shown on maps between the Bol'shaya Goromay River and the coastal village of Mivka also appears to be abandoned.

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Near Boatsyn, approximately 10 miles south of the Nutovo River, the railroad passes several small oil-development centers. In the immediate vicinity of Boatsyn are three oil wells and two oil-storage tanks. A narrow-gauge rail line runs from Boatsyn to a point on Zaliv Chayvo, where another oil-storage tank is located, and appears to intersect the main Okha-Nogliki line. Originally this line probably carried small tank cars pulled by horses or gasoline engines.

25X1D

[REDACTED] it is doubtful that the line is still in use.

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25X1D

From Boatsyn to the mouth of the Tym', [REDACTED] appear to be long stretches of railroad construction. The rail bed seems to have been completed between Boatsyn and the Evay River, but work on bridges was still in progress. South of the Khoyambushibiya River the line approaches the western shore of Zaliv Chayvo, passing opposite the small port of Chayvo, which is located on a spit stretching across the bay. Chayvo provides docking facilities for vessels with a draft of up to 12 feet, which is the navigational depth in the channel leading into Zaliv Chayvo. Chayvo is also the northern terminus of an inland barge canal to Nogliki.

Nogliki (population over 2,000) is situated on the south side of the Tym' River, near the apex of the delta. It is the administrative center of Vostochno-Sakhalinskiy Rayon as well as the focal point of the fishing industry along the east coast of northern

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Sakhalin. The settlement is also significant because of its proximity to the actively exploited Katangli oilfields, which extend from a few miles southeast of Nogliki to the Zaliv Nabil'skiy. An industrial rail line connects the settlement of Katangli (about 8 miles south of Nogliki) with the port of Kaygan on Zaliv Nabil'skiy. It terminates at a dock capable of handling ships of up to 2,000 tons.

Construction of the coastal railroad appeared to be under way in the Nogliki area in 1951. Although the building of railroad bridges was progressing, there were still a number of breaks in the rail alignment north of the Tym' River. Work on the railroad bed was in an advanced stage on the south side of the Tym' River, indicating that the line was being extended beyond the river crossing.

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As early as 1949 Japanese repatriates reported the construction of a new rail line to connect Okha with Aleksandrovsk. They quoted Soviet military guards as saying that this line was to be completed by 1952. The natural course of such a line would be to follow the established Okha-Nogliki line and then proceed in a south-southwesterly direction along the Tym' River to Tymovskoye, where it would connect with the narrow-gauge line reportedly leading to Arkova.

Railroad construction in the Tym' Valley is facilitated by several available supply routes. The Tym' River is navigable for

flat-bottomed barges and motorboats from Nogliki to Nysh (about 30 miles) at periods of low water, and up to Ado-Tymovo (about two-thirds of the distance to Tymovskoye) during high water. A wide trail along the south bank of the Tym' also connects Nogliki with Nysh. From Nysh a good motor road follows the Tym' for approximately 50 miles southward to Tymovskoye.

Railroad supplies may also be shipped from the Soviet mainland to the port of Arkova and thence via narrow-gauge railroad to Tymovskoye. The existence of this line has been reported by several sources, including the Far East Command's Terrain Study No. 10, Sakhalin.

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A road alignment

leading inland from Arkova but

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25X1D

It is quite possible, however,

that the road alignment is used for a railroad bed, as is frequently the case in the USSR proper. Grades across the coastal mountain range east of Arkova are extremely steep for a railroad. Short spur lines

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25X1D

within the town area of Aleksandrovsk


25X1D

No terminal or

servicing facilities are apparent in the town. Road alignments possibly used for a railroad, however, do extend to the northeast and southeast of Aleksandrovsk.

Railroad construction is also reported between Tymovskoye and the rail terminus of Pobedino in southern Sakhalin. According to a recently repatriated Japanese POW, the east-coast line of southern Sakhalin is being extended northward from Pobedino. This extension follows the Poronay River valley and crosses the 50th parallel into northern Sakhalin. If the report is true, the line would presumably continue along the Poronay River in the direction of Tymovskoye.

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25X1D

The alignment is believed to be the motor

road running from Poronaysk northward through Pobedino and Tymovskoye to Okha. It is quite possible, however, that

25X1D

a railroad may have been built on the road bed, which crosses no steep grades and has an exceptionally straight course.


New Railroad Lines in Southern Sakhalin

Since World War II the Soviets have added short stretches to the rail network of southern Sakhalin that they inherited from the Japanese. These new lines serve primarily coal mines, quarries, or other industrial installations. Japanese POW sources provide most of the basic data related to the construction and alignment of the lines.

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Gornozavodsk [Naihoru]-Shebunino [Minami-nayoshi] Line -- This extension of the west-coast line leads southward approximately 9 miles from the rail terminus of Gornozavodsk to the settlement of Shebunino. According to reports, the new line was completed in late 1948 and opened to traffic by 1949. Undoubtedly it was intended to alleviate the heavy truck-traffic load resulting from increased coal-mining and lumbering activities in the Shebunino area. The railroad skirts the western coastline, running in a narrow coastal plain backed by a steep bluff. A coastal highway closely parallels the railroad along most of its route. At Gornozavodsk the line crosses the mouth of the Shiinai-kawa (river; Japanese form of name, Russian unknown) over a trestle bridge supported by 12 or 13 piers. Five additional trestle bridges cross the larger streams, and numerous culvert-type crossings occur where there is seepage from the adjacent bluff. Reports indicate that this is a single-track narrow-gauge line, probably of the Japanese 3'6" or 2'6" type. Crushed stone is used for road ballast. The probable terminus of the line is on the south side of the Minami-nayoshi kawa (Japanese form, Russian unknown), where it ties in with several narrow-gauge spur lines serving an industrial site in Shebunino. No terminal yard facilities or turntables existed as of 1951, although at that time the construction of a railroad bridge across the Minami-nayoshi kawa was nearing completion.

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Industrial Line Between Shebunino and Interior Mining Settlement of Pervomaysk -- [REDACTED]

of a new railroad line connecting Shebunino with a coal-mining area located some 7 or 8 miles inland from the coast (probably adjacent to the settlement of Pervomaysk). This line originates on the south side of the Minami-nayoshi kawa, near the probable terminus of the Gornozavodsk-Shebunino line. It follows the south side of the meandering Minami-nayoshi kawa for approximately 2 miles, then crosses the river and continues along the north side, where it passes the small settlements of Naka-nayoshi and Oku-nayoshi (Japanese forms). North of the river the railroad is closely paralleled by a dirt road that also connects Shebunino with the coal-mining area. The road crosses and recrosses the railroad, and a network of power or telegraph lines also follow the railroad for most of its length. Within the Shebunino area, a short branch line forks off the main line and leads westward to the coast, eventually swinging southward; its ultimate destination is unknown.

Pobedino-Ganmon Line -- Japanese repatriates report a single-track 2'6"-gauge railroad between Pobedino and Ganmon (Japanese form), a limestone quarry some 31 miles to the east. According to these sources, the line was under construction before the end of World War II but was not completed by the Soviets until May 1948. Aerial photo [REDACTED] a rail line crossing the Poronay River near Pobedino and paralleling a dirt road leading eastward to

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a mining area. The Pobedino-Gammon line crosses a heavily forested area with fairly steep grades. Much of the roadbed is poorly constructed; it has a loose dirt base that after rainy days is not stable enough to carry railroad traffic. The Poronay River is crossed east of Pobedino by a span-type bridge, which according to reports is too weak to support heavy locomotives. The original bridge over the Poronay was demolished by heavy ice in the river. Several cuts, smaller bridges and culverts occur along the remainder of the route. Repatriates estimate the monthly shipment of limestone over the line at 400 tons during the summer and 250 tons during the winter. Most of the limestone is transshipped at Pobedino to the paper mill and cement plant at Poronaysk. At the time of observation, rolling stock consisted of 3 steam and 3 gasoline locomotives, 50 or 60 wooden gondolas of 2 to 3 tons capacity, and a few metal hopper cars.

Il'inskiy-Uglegorsk /Esutoru/ Line -- English-language maps, including CIA 11845 dated June 1951, show an extension of the west-coast line between Il'inskiy and Unari. That this line was completed in 1951 is doubtful. The Japanese construction program of 1938 included extension of the west-coast line to Uglegorsk, but 1951 photography shows that only the southern section of the roadbed and a few bridges had been completed. The remainder of the roadbed was still under construction, and work was yet to be started in the Uglegorsk area. Some reports claim that the Soviets intended to drop this project in favor of a railroad connection between Il'inskiy and

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
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Pereval'naya (Nikolayevka) [Manui] on the east-coast line. The latter route had supposedly been surveyed by 1948 and a roadbed partially constructed.

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THE 1954 FLOODS IN CHINA

Late in the afternoon of 18 August 1954, floodwaters piled up before Hankow to the highest level in 100 years of floods in China. On that day, the antiflood command at Hankow announced a record height of 97.6 feet, 4.6 feet higher than the disastrous 1931 flood that inundated about 39,000 square miles of highly productive farmland around Hankow and elsewhere along the Yangtze and the Huai Ho (Rivers).*

Along the Yangtze a greater area was flooded in 1954, but in the Huai river basin the 1954 floods are estimated to have been only 52 percent as severe as those of 1931. This difference was due in part to the extensive flood-control measures carried out by the Communists. Highlights of the 1954 flood situation were the protection of the central area of Hankow, and possibly some of the rich riceland east of it, at the expense of the low-lying areas surrounding Tung-t'ing Hu (lake) and P'o-yang Hu; and the protection of northern Kiangsu and much of the farmland to the north of the Huai Ho by last-minute dike reinforcement and the sacrifice of farmland within detention basins along the Huai.

*The area flooded in 1931 has been derived from planimeter measurements of a map entitled Map Prepared from Aerial Surveys Showing Seriously Flooded Areas Along Yangtse River, Hwai River and Grand Canal, dated August 1931, which was prepared by the National Flood Relief Commission and published by the Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, Shanghai. Although notes on this map state that 34,000 square miles were seriously flooded (exclusive of lakes), this figure is believed to be about 5,000 square miles too small.

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The map accompanying this article (13565) indicates the probable extent of flooding along the Yangtze and the Huai Ho. The delineation of flooded areas is derived from reports in the Chinese Communist press concerning river levels and flooded areas, plotted on large-scale topographic maps and analyzed. A comparison of the 1954 and earlier high water levels of the Yangtze and Huai is given in the following tables.


Table 1.

Flood and Mean Water Levels of the Yangtze
(in feet)

| <u>Location</u> | <u>Mean Water Level</u> | <u>1931 High Water</u> | <u>1954 High Water</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Nanking | 18 | 30 | 31.6 |
| Wu-hu | 22 | 39 | 42.2 |
| Ta-t'ung | 28 | 49 | 53.6 |
| Huai-ning | 34 | 57 | 61.9 |
| Hu-k'ou | 43 | 65 | 69.6 |
| Chiu-chiang | 45 | 67 | 72.4 |
| Ch'i-ch'un | 52 | 79 | 83.8 |
| Huang-shih-chiang | -- | -- | 86.0 |
| Hankow | 63 | 93 | 97.6 |
| T'ung-ling | 68 | 98 | 101.8 |
| Ch'eng-ling-chi | 79 | 109 | 112.7 |
| Chien-li | 90 | 118 | 120.0 |
| Sha-shih | 119 | 143 | 146.5 |
| Chih-chiang | 133 | 166 | 169.0 |
| I-ch'ang | 144 | 180 | 182.8 |

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Table 2. Flood Levels of the Huai Ho
(in feet)

| <u>Location</u> | <u>Previous Highest Water Level</u> | <u>1954 High Water</u> |
|-----------------|---|----------------------------|
| Hung-tze Hu | 46 | 56 <u>a/</u> |
| Shuang-kou | 52 | 62 <u>a/</u> |
| Wu-ho | 56 | 66 <u>a/</u> |
| Lin-huai-kuan | 59 | 69 <u>a/</u> |
| Pang-fou | 62 | 72.6 |
| Feng-t'ai | 74 | 82 <u>a/</u> |
| Cheng-yang-kuan | 79 | 86.6 |
| Jun-ho-chi | 85 | 89 <u>a/</u> |
| San-ho-ch'ien | 89 | 92 <u>a/</u> |
| Wang-chia-pa | 95 | 96.5 |

a. Projected from river profiles.

Analysis of 1954 data indicates that, excluding normal lake areas, about 38,400 square miles along the Yangtze River were probably inundated for over a month. An additional 8,500 square miles in the T'ai Hu and Shanghai plains were flooded locally as a result of heavy rains and slow drainage of the low-lying land, but these areas were probably under water less than a month. Because reports of flooding along the Huai Ho were less specific than those for the Yangtze area, the map shows maximum and minimum estimates of the flooded area, ranging from 5,000 square miles to 12,000 square miles. Apparently, flooding along the Yellow River was negligible in 1954. No dike breaks were reported or are believed to have occurred. Floodwaters were probably restricted to the two detention basins indicated on the map. The extent of the areas inundated in six provinces of Central China are listed in Table 3.

Table 3. Extent of Flooding
 (in square miles)

| Province | Total Area Under Floodwaters | | Areas Normally Under Water (at low water level) | Actual Areas Flooded a/ |
|--|---------------------------------|-------|--|----------------------------|
| | Yangtze | Huai | | |
| Anhwei | 7,700 | 3,600 | 1,700 | 9,600 |
| Honan | -- | 2,600 | -- | 2,600 |
| Hunan | 11,000 | -- | 1,200 | 9,800 |
| Hupei | 13,500 | -- | 700 | 12,800 |
| Kiangsi | 4,600 | -- | 1,600 | 3,000 |
| Kiangsu (excluding T'ai Hu Area) | 1,600 | 2,400 | 700 | 3,300 |
| Total | 38,400 | 8,600 | 5,900 | 41,100 |

a. Excluding normal water areas.

It is estimated that over 20 million people in six provinces were directly affected by the 1954 floods. The population affected in each of the provinces is given below:

Table 4.

Number of People Directly Affected by Floods, 1954 a/

| | |
|---------|------------------|
| Anhwei | 5,155,200 |
| Honan | 1,804,400 |
| Hunan | 4,125,800 |
| Hupei | 4,940,800 |
| Kiangsi | 795,000 |
| Kiangsu | <u>3,273,600</u> |
| Total | 20,094,800 |

a. Living in areas
flooded for a month or more.

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These estimates do not include people affected indirectly, among whom were those engaged in flood fighting and relief or rehabilitation work; those affected by the loss of food supply or by the disruption of transportation, industrial, or communications facilities; the populations of low-lying areas in the vicinity of T'ai Hu and Shanghai and in Chekiang, where agricultural land was flooded for periods of less than a month; and 1 million people in Nanking and 600,000 in Hankow, who were isolated by the floodwaters for an extended period. Of the 20 million directly affected, those who survived the flood must have been evacuated and relocated in places of safety, where they could be fed and sheltered during the flood period of July, August, and part of September. After the waters receded (probably sometime in November), flood refugees would have required help in rehabilitating their buildings and sodden, silt-laden farmlands. Famine, the usual consequence of major floods, appears to have been inevitable. The extent and severity of the famine would depend largely upon the amount of help given the flood victims in reconstruction and replanting by the Communist regime. The pattern of famine during the winter and spring will coincide generally with the pattern of population displacement and crop loss.

Probably the most severe consequence of the 1954 floods was the loss of crops, particularly summer food crops. Table 5 gives a rough estimate of the number of square miles of cultivated land flooded and the consequent crop losses in the six provinces most seriously affected by the floods.

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The largest food loss as a result of the floods was in Hunan, where almost half of the rice crop was lost, presumably in the surplus rice producing area around Tung-t'ing Hu. The second largest area of crop loss was in Hupeh, probably in the surplus rice growing area on the floodplain southwest of Hankow. The greatest loss of kaoliang and soybeans was in Anhwei. Least damage to cultivated land was incurred in Honan and Kiangsu, possibly reflecting the relatively high degree of success that the Communists had attained in alleviating flooding by the use of detention basins and dike reinforcement.

No attempt has been made in Table 5 to indicate winter food-crop losses or the loss of cotton and tobacco, both of which are important industrial crops in central China. The loss of winter crops cannot be estimated, since some of them are grown on uplands that were not flooded. Much also depends upon the ability of the Chinese to drain flooded lands and make them ready for the planting of winter crops by October or November. In northern Anhwei and Hupeh, for instance, water levels along the Huai probably dropped sufficiently by September to permit the planting of winter wheat, whereas the planting of winter crops in the area north of the middle Yangtze in Anhwei and Hupeh would probably be prevented by the slow runoff of water. In the latter area, continuing high water levels probably canceled out the second rice crop as well as the first. The cotton crop, concentrated in the area southwest of Hankow, was also lost because its normal July-September harvest coincided with the high-water period of the Yangtze.

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Table 5. Cultivated Land Flooded and Consequent Crop Loss

| Crops | Anhui | | Henan | | Hubei | | Kiangsi | | Kiangsu | | Total | |
|------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Square Miles Flooded | Crop Loss (Net Tons) | Square Miles Flooded | Crop Loss (Net Tons) | Square Miles Flooded | Crop Loss (Net Tons) | Square Miles Flooded | Crop Loss (Net Tons) | Square Miles Flooded | Crop Loss (Net Tons) | Square Miles Flooded | Crop Loss (Net Tons) |
| Rice | 2,170 | 1,306,645 | 65 | 33,581 | 5,863 | 3,748,160 | 1,747 | 1,230,937 | 1,056 | 822,850 | 17,183 | 12,323,924 |
| Coarse grains a/ | 950 | 354,199 | 1,105 | 396,791 | 1,587 | 607,209 | 180 | 89,556 | 624 | 325,859 | 5,250 | 2,235,344 |
| Oilseeds b/ | 1,190 | 330,784 | 491 | 132,147 | 1,280 | 390,336 | 370 | 104,115 | 677 | 256,433 | 4,419 | 1,357,925 |
| Cotton | 240 | 15,071 | 182 | 9,350 | 1,420 | 89,218 | 87 | 4,718 | 455 | 29,896 | 2,727 | 168,812 |
| Other c/ | 5,050 | 2,145,497 | 757 | 313,912 | 2,650 | 1,101,520 | 616 | 256,884 | 488 | 207,692 | 11,521 | 4,797,527 |
| Total: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Summer crops d/ | 4,310 | 1,991,628 | 1,661 | 562,519 | 8,730 | 4,745,705 | 2,297 | 1,424,608 | 2,357 | 1,405,142 | 26,852 | 15,917,193 |
| All crops | 9,600 | 4,137,125 | 2,600 | 885,781 | 12,800 | 5,936,443 | 3,000 | 1,686,210 | 3,300 | 1,642,730 | 41,100 | 20,883,532 |

a/ Includes corn, millet, kaoliang, and sweet potatoes (converted to grain equivalent).

b/ Includes soybeans, peanuts, and sesame.

c/ Includes tobacco, winter crops (that normally are not followed by any of the summer crops indicated below or on land that is fallow over the summer) and nonagricultural land (villages, burial mounds, etc.).

d/ Includes rice, coarse grains, and oilseeds as listed in the table.

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The effect of the floods on industry in central China was probably most serious at the Yung-li Chemical Plant, located on the Yangtze floodplain northeast of Nanking. Unless the Communists were able to take adequate protective measures, water and silt damage to electric motors, generators, and other electrical equipment in the plant would have been severe. Industrial areas in Shanghai, Nanking, and Hankow were probably adequately protected from floodwaters by diking, as was the iron and steel plant at Ta-yeh. It is likely, however, that the open-pit iron mines at Ta-yeh were flooded and will be out of commission for some time.

The effect of floods on rail transportation is believed to be temporary. Information on the condition of roadbeds, track, and way structures is insufficient to permit assessment of the probable damage from prolonged submersion. Washouts were likely at major stream and river crossings during the heavy rains of June, July, and August.

Despite the extent of damage, the severity of 1954 floods and the pattern of flooding suggest that in some areas the flood-control projects of the Communists were relatively successful in alleviating the effects of the floods. In other places, control projects were as ineffectual as the group of Chinese flood fighters who reportedly stood hand in hand, with straw mats on their backs, trying to hold back the waters in a dike breach.

The Chingchiang detention basin (see Map 13565) above Hankow was designed to provide a safety valve for crests coming down the

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Yangtze toward Wu-han and the surplus rice producing area of Tung-t'ing Hu. Although it lowered the estimated crest by 28 inches for 1 day at Sha-shih, the detention basin apparently was quickly filled to its capacity of 176 billion cubic feet. The basin was opened on July 22 and drew off 197,680 cubic feet of water a second. In 2 days, it had impounded over 35 billion cubic feet of water, one-fifth of its capacity. By late July or mid-August, it had been partially drained to prepare for further high waters, which, in fact, arrived during the second and third weeks of August.

The Tung-t'ing Hu area also had to be sacrificed in an effort to protect Hankow, since the Ching-chiang detention basin proved inadequate. The effort was apparently successful insofar as the central part of the city was concerned. However, by extending protection to Hankow, the "protected areas" of the south Tung-t'ing Hu Reclamation Project (almost completed last spring) were allowed to be flooded. This project, with about 3,000 acres of reclaimed land and 44,000 acres of producing land, was to be enclosed within a system of dikes, drainage canals, and regulation locks in order to provide much-needed extension of the surplus rice producing region.

Another area of concentrated flood-control activity is located along the Ching-chiang dike opposite the Ching-chiang detention basin. The dike extends from Chiang-ling on the north bank of the Yangtze, past Sha-shih, to a bend of the river known as Ma-pu-kai. Although the purpose of this dike was ostensibly to protect the rich farmland

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behind it, it is believed that the actual purpose was to relieve flood pressure on dikes to the north and northwest of Hankow. The strengthening of the dike evidently spared the agricultural land behind it from inundation. The dike, however, was not adequate to protect Hankow, and low-lying land in the vicinity of Hung Hu and several areas along the Han Chiang were reportedly opened as flood-detention basins.

Antiflood work from Hankow to Shanghai was limited to the strengthening of weak spots in the dikes and to evacuation and rescue work along the Yangtze from P'o-yang Hu to Nanking (see map).

Flood-control projects were more numerous in the Huai river basin than along the Yangtze. These efforts may be responsible for the decline in flooding as compared with 1931. At least four reservoirs and detention basins were in operation in 1954. The height of dikes was also raised 3 feet in stretches along the middle and lower courses of the river. The supplementary outlet for Huai Ho waters afforded by the North Kiangsu (Su-pei) Main Irrigation Channel via the Kao-liang regulator dam helped prevent the spread of flooding to the irrigated land in northern Kiangsu between the Grand Canal and the sea.

Probably more efficacious in relieving pressure on the Huai Ho dikes was the use of detention basins, controlled by newly built regulator dams located along the middle course of the river. During the high-water period in mid-August, eight floodplain areas between Cheng-yang-kuan and San-ho-chien were opened and flooded beyond their planned capacities -- the Meng-ho, Hsi Hu, Tung Hu, Meng-chia Hu,

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Chiang-chia Hu, Chiu-chia Hu, T'ang-to Hu, and Wa-fou Hu detention basins. These, together with the Hung-tse Hu detention basin and the "Fang-chiu Hu" flood-diversion area in the vicinity of Lin-huai-kuan, stored over 706 billion cubic feet of floodwaters during the high-water period. The flood-detention basins are generally diked, have regulated inlets and outlets, and are cultivated in nonflood years. In times of flood, detention-basin farmland is considered expendable and the farming population is evacuated to safe areas. The areas committed to flood detention have been included in the tabulations of flooded areas, population affected, and crops lost (Tables 3, 4, and 5).

Three additional flood-detention basins and four reservoirs* in the upper Huai were reported as filled to capacity. They are the Shih-man-tan, Pan-chiao, Pai-sha, and Po-shan reservoirs and the Lao-wang-po, Chiao-ting Hu, and Tung Hu detention basins (see map). The middle-course detention basins, together with those on the upper course, and the four reservoirs are believed to have lessened the pressure of floodwaters on dikes along the lower Huai sufficiently to prevent widespread flooding of farmlands north of the Huai in the vicinity of Pang-fou or east of the Grand Canal dike in northern Kiangsu.

It is believed that flooding along the Yellow River was negligible, although the Peking People's Daily reports that "10 crests

*Up to late spring 1954 the Communist press had reported the completion of only three reservoirs.

were tided over on the Yellow River." Presumably the volume of flow was not great enough to set in motion the violent meandering that is the usual cause of dike breaches and flooding along the Yellow River. Considerable attention was also paid to dike maintenance and repair along the river during the high-water period. In addition to these measures, the new Shih-tou-chiang detention basin along the northern bank of the river and the area around Tung-p'ing Hu were opened to relieve the pressure of floodwaters. Diking and the use of water-detention basins apparently enabled the Communists to keep the Yellow River in its channel and prevented widespread flood damage of the lowlands to the south.

"Under the principle of subordinating minor interest to major interests and subordinating partial interests to overall interests, the People's government energetically and on its initiative diverted the flood and detained the flood and moved the people of flood detention areas to safety areas beforehand and assisted the calamity stricken people in a planned manner. All this played an important part in defending cities, removing dangers to certain cities like Wuhan and protecting agricultural production in vast areas." Thus an official of the Central Anti-Flood Headquarters in Peking summarizes the basic policy followed in the 1954 fight against the floods. All detention basins and reservoirs available for use were opened in an effort to protect Wu-han, the agricultural area to the southwest of Wu-han, and the critical transportation center of Pang-fou.

The dilemma of the officials responsible for flood control is apparent. On the one hand is the urgent need for more riceland in the fertile Central Yangtze Basin. The South Tung-t'ing Hu Reclamation Project is but one example of the effort to extend rice production into previously marginal producing areas. On the other hand is the imperative need for flood-detention areas for times of high-water crisis. Tung-t'ing Hu is barely large enough for detention of a normal year's floodwaters; the capacity of the Ching-chiang detention basin is but a drop in the lily pond. To use the same area for flood control and land reclamation is to try to have your rice cake and eat it, too. Nevertheless, considering the relative success of detention basins and reservoirs along the Huai and the calamitous proportions of the Yangtze flood, it would seem likely that an increase in flood-control activities will be noted during the coming year. These activities may take the form of the construction of more and larger detention basins, or a renewal of interest in a Yangtze gorge dam, or the channelization of the river. But whatever program of flood control is advanced, it will have behind it the impetus of widespread famine, which will certainly follow the 1954 floods. (SECRET)

REVISED MAP OF CHINESE COMMUNIST "AUTONOMOUS" ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS*

Since the publication of Map 12667, Communist Autonomous Administrative Units -- 1953, dated June 1953,** the Chinese Communist Government has created a number of additional so-called "autonomous" administrative units and has altered the status of others. Map 13517 accompanying this article is a revision of the 1953 map that gives information as of September 1954. It differs from the earlier map as follows: (1) only autonomous administrative units at or above the hsien (county) level are shown and listed; (2) no attempt has been made to classify individual units by type from the insufficient data available; and (3) the name of the principal ethnic group of each autonomous unit is included in the title of the unit.

During the past year, major Chinese Communist efforts have been directed toward organizing the diverse ethnic groups of Yunnan, Tsinghai, Ningsia, and Sinkiang Provinces. Within Yunnan, four units at "special district" level*** have been created, of which three adjoined the strategic Burma frontier. Chinese Communist activity

*See CIA/RR-G-7, Autonomous Governments in Minority-Inhabited Areas of Communist China, 3 July 1953 (Secret), for additional information on this subject.

**Map 12667 accompanied an article in Map Intelligence Review MR-37, August 1953, pp. 28-30.

***A special district (chuan ch'ü) is an intermediate administrative unit between province and hsien, normally comprising between 5 and 15 hsien.

among the border tribes has been viewed with concern by neighboring countries in which large numbers of these border peoples -- Tai, Kachin, Lisu, and others -- are also found. Traditional Communist divide et impera tactics are well illustrated in largely Tibetan-populated Tsinghai, where several small, easily manageable Tibetan units have been set up. In Ningsia (absorbed into Kansu Province in September 1954), two special-district units have been organized, one embracing Hui people -- Chinese-speaking Moslems -- and the other Mongols. Ethnically diverse Sinkiang, with only about 5 percent of its inhabitants Chinese, has always posed problems for Chinese control, and its history has been punctuated with insurrections. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has maintained considerable economic and political interest in Sinkiang. The length of time it has taken the Chinese Communists to implement "regional autonomy" is an indication that extensive preparation was necessary before the inhabitants were considered ready for this step.

The organizing of autonomous people's governments appears to be nearing completion. Recent reports indicate that several additional units at special-district level will soon be set up in Sinkiang. Elsewhere, only Tibet, western Sikang Province, and a few small minority-inhabited areas in southwestern China are without some form of "autonomous" administration. Tibet (including western Sikang, which traditionally has been governed from Lhasa) has considered itself independent despite contrary Chinese claims, a unique situation

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INNER MONGOLIA
ADMINISTRATIVE AREA LEVEL
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
HUMAN OR EQUIVALENT LEVEL
1. Chongxin Autonomous Banner

NORTHEAST CHINA
SPECIAL DISTRICT LEVEL
Yan-jin Korean Autonomous District
HUMAN OR EQUIVALENT LEVEL
2. Wang-ni-tu (Ciguizi) Mongol Autonomous Banner
3. Aizhan (Aizhan) Mongol Autonomous Banner
4. Kola-shih (Kharzin) Mongol Autonomous Banner
5. Kola-shih (Kharzin) Mongol Autonomous Banner

[illegible]

SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST CHINA

OFFICIAL REPORTED LARVAE

Long-shan Ti (Lao) Autonomous District
Hubei-Tibet Autonomous District
Sangshun Tibetan Autonomous District
Hong-chang-pao-tai Tibetan Autonomous District
Tibet Autonomous District
Nu-Chang Liao Autonomous District
Tibetan-Tu-Kashan Autonomous District
Shanxi Autonomous District
Tibet Autonomous District
West Kham (Kang-sha) Mao Autonomous District
West Kham (Kang-sha) Mao Autonomous District
West Kham (Kang-sha) Mao Autonomous District

ON NON-REPORTED LARVAE

12. Nu-Tai Tibetan Autonomous Area
18. Lo-Shan Mao Autonomous Area
21. Tai-chang Mao Autonomous Area
22. Hui-shan-Tai Autonomous Area
23. Tai-chai Mao Autonomous Area
24. Tung-tao T'ung T'ing Autonomous Area
25. Lung-cheng Multinational Autonomous Area
26. Tung-tao T'ung T'ing Autonomous Area
27. T'ai-shan-shan Mao Autonomous Area
27. Lin-shan Yu Autonomous Area
28. T'ai-shan-shan Mao Autonomous Area
29. Lung-cheng Multinational Autonomous Area
30. Mo-tai T'ung T'ing Autonomous Area
31. Chai-shan Mao Autonomous Area
32. Chang-cheng Hsiao-tai Autonomous Area

NOTES

Autonomous administrative units below the nation (county) level have not been shown because of incomplete data and the scale of this map.

The so-called "autonomous administrative units" listed here possess no real autonomy and are completely subordinated to Chinese Communist control. Boundaries of the autonomous units are often arbitrarily defined and possess very little administrative significance.



| | | |
|------------------------------------|---------|----------------------------|
| International boundary | Tierlin | Communist municipality |
| International boundary, indefinite | ⊕ | Communist capital |
| Communist-province boundary | ⊙ | Communist-province capital |

Communist "Autonomous" Administrative Unit date as of August 1954

that apparently has presented thorny problems. Thus far there has been no indication that autonomous governments are contemplated for these areas.

When Suiyuan Province was absorbed by the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in March 1954, the Mongol-inhabited Ikechao and Ulanhap Leagues were changed in status from autonomous districts to presumably ordinary special districts. The reasons for this action are obscure.

Boundary data for autonomous units included on Map 13517 were taken from recent Chinese maps supplemented by press releases. Despite the apparently definite boundaries and areas shown, administrative control exercised by an autonomous government is in many cases likely to be confined to urban centers and their immediate environs. Unless a very detailed administrative map of China is desired, there is little need to indicate autonomous administrative units at or below the special-district level. (CONFIDENTIAL)

RECENT TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

During the relatively short span of Communist rule, the territorial-administrative structure of China has undergone periodic inspection, and changes have been so rapid and so numerous that administrative maps of China have required almost constant revision. Continuing the trend, an announcement from Peking on 19 June 1954 again altered the pattern of regional, provincial, and municipal administration. The new pattern is shown on Map 13516, which accompanies this article.

The most important of Peking's June proclamations abolished the major administrative areas (ta-hsing-cheng-ch'u). With the regional level of government thus eliminated, administrative control reverts essentially to the pre-1949 system, in which provinces were governed directly from the national capital.

The major administrative areas were created in early 1950, when Communist control over China was incomplete and basic Chinese Communist programs were in the early stages of implementation. Initially, area governments were directed by military-administrative committees that wielded considerable power; in late 1952, however, area governments were reorganized, and the "administrative committees" then established had greatly lessened authority. By mid-1954, basic Chinese Communist economic and social "reforms" had been instituted, and the country had, in the words of Communist officialdom, "entered the stage of planned economic construction" necessi-



tating "further strengthening of the concentrated and unified leadership of the Central Government." Not unexpectedly, the various area administrative committees have "unanimously" adopted resolutions praising the abolishment of regional government by the Central Government Council as a "timely and proper move." In addition to Peking's announced motives for this decision, it is likely that the move was also designed to restrict the authority of certain regional leaders and to decrease the possibility of the rise of rival independent governments at the regional level. The net result of this action will mean even greater centralization of authority at Peking. The June pronouncement gave no definite schedule for the change except to say that "adequate preparatory work" must be done to "properly execute" the actual transfer of authority.*

The June announcement indicated that several changes were to be made at provincial level, as follows: (1) incorporation of Ningsia into Kansu Province, (2) amalgamation of Liaosi and Liaotung to reconstitute Liaoning Province, and (3) incorporation of Sungkiang into Heilungkiang Province.** This reduces the number of provinces

*The North China and Northeast China Administrative Committees were abolished on 15 August 1954, the Southwest China Administrative Committee on 1 November 1954, and the Central-South China Administrative Committee on 8 November 1954.

**Liaoning was established and Sungkiang was absorbed into Heilungkiang on 1 August 1954; the incorporation of Ningsia into Kansu was consummated on 27 September 1954.

from 28 to 25, excluding Tibet and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and to this limited extent will simplify national administration. The present provincial breakdown of Manchuria into Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning reestablishes the traditional provinces of pre-1931 Manchuria, although not their exact territorial limits. Also, prior to 1928 the southeastern portion of Ningsia had been included within Kansu.

Under the Chinese Communist regime, some 14 (the number has varied) large and/or industrially important cities have been designated as "special municipalities" under the direct control of Peking. At present only Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai remain directly under Peking's jurisdiction, with the remaining 11 cities returned to provincial administration. The official explanation for these provincial and municipality alterations is that they are made "to facilitate the Central Government's leadership . . . particularly to cope with the demand of economic construction."

With the implementation of these latest decisions, the Chinese Communists may have completed their present cycle of territorial-administrative fluctuations. It is even possible that the administrative map of China may go unchanged for as long as 12 or even 18 months! (CONFIDENTIAL)

NEW WORLD ATLAS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A new Czechoslovak world atlas for school use has become available in the United States.* The volume is noteworthy as an example both of recent Czech cartographic work and of zealous, though not always successful, efforts to conform to the party line.

Cartographically and typographically, the atlas is about average for European works of its type; it is above the standard of many U.S. atlases prepared for school and reference use. The volume does not compare favorably, however, with the excellent national atlas (Atlas Republiky Československé) produced by the Czech Academy in 1935.

The allocation of page space and the order of presentation of areas reflect an appreciation on the part of the compilers of the requirements for remaining healthy behind the Iron Curtain. Maps of Czechoslovakia are presented first, followed by those of the USSR, the latter taking up somewhat more space than the former. Maps of Europe appear next, beginning with Communist countries. The section on Asia stresses China and is fairly complete, but Africa, the Americas, and Australia are treated very superficially. In addition to the general country or regional maps, the atlas includes a few

*Bedřich Šalomon, and Karel Kuchař, Školní Zeměpisný Atlas, Státní Pedagogické Nakladatelství, Prague, 1953. CIA Map Library Call No. aA000.C94 1953. Unclassified.

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special-subject maps, some astronomical charts, and several well-drafted pages on map reading.

In presenting boundaries and other data relevant to territorial claims, the compilers seem in some cases to have strayed from the Moscow line. For example, the boundary between Mongolia and China appears to be more in agreement with Chinese Communist maps than with the Soviet (and presumably Mongolian) interpretation. The map makers' dilemma is easy to understand, but it would seem that choice of the Soviet version would have been more logical, as well as safer, from the Czech point of view.

The USSR's claim to an extensive sector of the Arctic Ocean is represented on the map of the north polar area in the same way as on most Soviet maps. The Czech presentation, however, also locates Norwegian, Danish, Canadian, and United States sectors, although not all of these have been officially claimed by the countries concerned and are rarely shown on Soviet maps. Oddly, the voyage of the Russian F. F. Bellingshausen, who according to the Soviet claim discovered the Antarctic continent in 1820, is omitted from the map of the south polar area, although the routes of numerous other explorers, including Americans, are shown. Other deviations from Soviet modes of presentation are to be found on the maps of Arabia, which also locate some boundaries incorrectly from any point of view.

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